This week the United States Congress approved another $40 billion in military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine, bringing the total to $54 billion since the outbreak of the war. The West’s focus on the provision of military aid is sensible, yet as others have written, little thought has been given to the ends to which those weapons are put.
Three months into the war, it appears not much consideration has been given to the effects of this war and the impact regional response to the conflict will have in the longer term. Washington and other European capitals must think beyond the immediate military campaign to the broader geopolitical strategic questions and considerations, not the least of which is a militarily and economically hobbled pariah Russian state — something that is being obscured by the unwarranted triumphalist rhetoric and narrow focus on the theatre aspects of this war.
There are, unsurprisingly, far more questions than answers as the war is not yet over and the post-war environment is equally unclear. Nonetheless, there are outlines forming and issues on the horizon with which the West will have to contend. Sadly, one would be forgiven for thinking that that policy and news cycles appear to have moved on. Here, it is not the absence of answers that is alarming, but the fact that the questions are not being asked at all that should concern the public.
Ukraine’s forces have, in some places, pushed Russian forces back to pre-invasion lines of control and borders — progress that is to be commended. There is a risk that the newly emergent triumphalism will be just as blinding as the (accurate) narratives of Ukrainian heroism in the face of overwhelming odds. This has led to ill-considered rhetorical questions as to whether Ukraine will invade Russia. These questions do nothing more than illustrate the lack of forethought in policymaking and feed into Russia’s information war.
There is also the risk of mismanaged expectations for Ukrainian success, that Kyiv’s progress will somehow lead to a reversal of 2014 losses and it retaking Crimea and ending the frozen conflict on its eastern border. At the same time, much of the punditry’s discussions about the war’s end have omitted the agency of the Ukrainians themselves, as though an accord will be reached between Washington and Moscow.
Washington and others must also begin thinking through how the war’s end could set the stage for the next conflict. A militarily weakened and economically hobbled Russia will not sit idly by, simply retreating to its corner and refraining from responding. This is not a call for limited aims when it comes to Russia, rather, a recognition that the war’s end will inevitably affect European peace and security in the year after and the five years beyond. Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO (Turkey’s objections notwithstanding) will unequivocally be a net positive for the alliance, but considering how the enlarged alliance will respond to Russia’s post-Ukraine behavior is critical for its long-term success.
The full effect of Western sanctions on Russia is also yet to be felt. In the near term, Moscow has artificially buoyed the ruble and, at least superficially (and likely temporarily), adapted to the economic pressure — due to significant state intervention. Expectations that this should continue to be the case are misguided. The long tail economic impact is unclear. The shortage of precursor goods and finished products will increasingly affect Russia’s industrial base, and whilst autarky is attractive for some within Russia’s politics, it is likely unsustainable for the country.
While the economic interconnectedness of Russia with Europe and the world did not stop it from invading Ukraine, a wholly disconnected Russia would have little to lose from acting in the future, whether under the leadership of President Vladimir Putin or a successor. The West’s willingness to incur continued economic disruption as a function of disconnecting from Russia is by no means guaranteed. Severing energy relationships may be politically palatable now, but as market competitiveness decreases and domestic populations feel the pain, it is unclear whether this is sustainable. This is to say nothing of the fact that the non-Western world — Latin and South America, Africa, and Asia — have continued to trade with Russia. A global response to Ukraine, this is assuredly not.
The cover story of the most recent Economist highlights the critically underappreciated secondary and tertiary effects of the war, not the least of which is food shortages. Russia and Ukraine are two of the world’s largest producers of grains and as a result of sanctions on the former and the war in the latter, this production is severely disrupted, if not outright halted. This will dramatically affect the Middle East and Africa, which imports a significant amount of its food from both countries. This, in turn, raises prices, puts pressure on government subsidies and leads to greater instability. Is the West preparing for or thinking about the resulting conflicts, whether new or exacerbated? Likely not.
While Europe has rhetorically and militarily responded effectively to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it has not fully gripped the leadership mantel of a war on its doorstep. That still resides with Washington as does, thus far, the bill for economic aid and relief to Kyiv. Rebuilding and reconnecting Ukraine with the world will not be cheap, and European leadership and investment will be critical. The G7’s recent commitment to provide $19.8 billion to aid Ukraine’s public finances is a good start. Yet, will European capitals be able and willing to address the longer-term challenges both in Ukraine and within their own countries resulting from the war?
The military aspect of the conflict in Ukraine will likely, in hindsight, appear to have been the easiest and simplest part of the war. It is insufficient to only focus on this part of the war. The West must think about the war’s impact beyond Ukraine and how the ripples will be felt in other parts of the world and the global nature of global affairs.
Joshua C. Huminski is director of the Mike Rogers Center for Intelligence & Global Affairs at the Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress and a George Mason University National Security Institute fellow. He can be found on Twitter @joshuachuminski.
